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Coming to America: 
Does Immigrant’s Home Country Economic Status 
Impact the Probability of Self-Employment in the U.S.?
*
 
This paper examines the impact of home country economic status on immigrant self-
employment probability in the U.S. We estimate a probability model and find that, consistent 
across race, immigrants from developed countries are more likely to be self-employed in the 
U.S than are immigrants from developing countries. This result is unexpected given previous 
research which suggests that immigrants from countries with high levels of self-employment 
tend to be more involved in self-employment in the U.S. Developing countries on average 
have higher self-employment rates than do developed countries but our research shows that 
immigrants from developing countries have similar or lower self-employment probabilities 
relative to native born White Americans, whereas immigrant from developed countries have 
significantly higher self-employment probabilities relative to native born White Americans. We 
provide two potential explanations for this result. First, immigrants from developed countries 
may indeed have more and better access to start-up capital from their country of origin. 
Second, institutional arrangements in the developed world may be similar across countries 
allowing immigrants from developed countries to have an informational advantage over 
immigrants from developing countries. 
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* Data for this paper was derived from IPUMS. Comments are appreciated. 1 Introduction and Background
Self-employment in the United State has been of interest to policy-makers for a number of reasons:
First, many believe that self-employment provides a time tested method for recent immigrants,
minorities, and other under-represented groups to break the poverty cycle allowing entry into main-
stream U.S. economic life. Second, since immigrations has been responsible for the lion-share of U.S.
population growth of the last 30 years, many are concerned about the impact of increased immi-
grant population on the country’s ability to provide social and economic services to its’ population.
Historically, immigrants were thought to be predisposed to self-employment providing additional
employment opportunities for themselves and many other Americans. Briggs and Moore (1994) ar-
gued that the distinguishing characteristic of immigrants is their very high levels of entrepreneurship.
Since immigrants were thought to create more beneﬁts than costs even conservative commentator
Joel Kotkin (Kotkin 1991) argued that immigration should be encouraged.
Yuengert (1995) and Fairlie and Meyer (1996) provide the most recent research that explicitly
investigates the role of home country attributes in the immigrant’s self-employment decision in
the U.S. Based on home country attributes, Yuengert (1995) ﬁnds that immigrants from countries
with high self-employment rates relative to U.S. rates tend to pursue self-employment at a higher
rate than do natives. He argues that experiences in the informal sector of the home country is
a form of sector-speciﬁc human capital inclining immigrants more toward self-employment in the
United States. This process could work through increased immigrant eﬃciency in starting up and/or
managing new businesses venture or immigrants could have more human and/or ﬁnancial capital to
invest in a self-employment venture (See Bogan and Darity 2008). Fairlie and Meyers (1996) argue
that we need to be more cautious about this conclusion. They ﬁnd that if the probability model is
estimated removing natives from the data set, that self-employment rate of the home country does
not have a signiﬁcant statistical impact on an ethnic group’s self-employment probability in the U.S.
In this research we attempt to further investigate the home country hypothesis by examining the
impact of home country economic standing on the probability of self-employment of U.S. immigrants.
We distinguish home country economic standing by dividing all countries into two groups; developed
2and developing countries. From a ﬁnancial and education resources availability perspective, a priori,
one could argue that immigrants from developed countries should, on average, be more prepared
to engage in self-employment than are their developing nation counterparts. However, Yuengert
(1995) ﬁnds that immigrants from countries where the percent of the labor force that identiﬁes as
self-employed is large relative to the U.S. percentage, are more likely to seek self-employment in the
United States. Consulting the Yearbook of Labor Statistics (2005), we examine a subset of immigrant
home countries including those of Latin and South America, Asia, eastern and western Europe and
Africa. We ﬁnd that countries with self-employment rates that are signiﬁcantly higher than that
of the U.S. are generally those that are identiﬁed by the World Bank and the IMF (International
Monetary Fund) as developing or less developed countries. Given this ﬁnding, the implication of
Yuengert’s work is that after immigrating to the U.S., immigrants from developing countries are
more likely to pursue self-employment than are immigrants from developed countries. In what
follows we carefully investigate the impact of home country economic standing on self-employment
probabilities for U.S. immigrants.
First, we partition the sample based on race and country of birth. For those born outside the
U.S., we break down the sample based on citizenship and home country’s economic status. Using
logit and probit models, we estimate the probability of self-employment for all groups relative to
U.S. born White Americans our base comparison group. We ﬁnd that foreigners from developing
countries have lower self-employment probabilities than do U.S. born White Americans, while for-
eigners from developed countries have higher self-employment probabilities relative to U.S. born
White Americans. Further, considering naturalized citizens relative to U.S. born White Americans
we ﬁnd that those from developing countries have lower self-employment probabilities than those
from developed countries but similar or lower probabilities than U.S. born White Americans. In an
attempt to examine the robustness of our result we follow Fairlie and Myers (1996) and re-estimate
all models base on a sample of immigrants only. We ﬁnd that immigrants from a developed countries
have a higher probability of self-employment in the U.S. than do their developing country counter-
parts. Given the robustness of our results we provide two possible explanations for our empirical
3outcomes: First, immigrants from developed countries may indeed have more and better access to
start-up capital from their country of origin and may ﬁnd it easier to start a business. Second, in-
stitutional arrangements, business types, and business “know-how” may be similar across countries
in the developed world. This could lead to an advantage for immigrants from developed countries
with respect self-employment success in the U.S.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section provides an overview high-
lighting important attributes of the data set. Section 3 describes the econometric approach and,
in a step by step format, outline the identiﬁcation strategy, provide econometric results, and also
oﬀer robustness checks of key results. Sections 4 provides alternative explanations of our empirical
results. The ﬁnal section contains a discussion of inferences, conclusions, and recommendations.
2 Data
2.1 General Description of Datasets
We make use of the March Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is micro-data that pro-
vides information about individual persons and households. It is a monthly U.S. household survey
conducted jointly by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We derive multi-
stage stratiﬁed samples of the CPS from IPUMS. The IPUMS-CPS data are available for 46 years
(1962-2007). We use data from 1994-2002 because of the existence of important variables which, in
many cases, were not surveyed until 1994. For example, parent’s birthplace was not available in the
CPS before 1994. Similarly, post 2002 the coding for race changed signiﬁcantly as the variable that
captures race was broken into several subcategories making it more diﬃcult to easily identify groups
of interest. Speciﬁcally, prior to 2003 the number of race categories ranged from 3 (White, Ne-
gro, and other) to 5 (White, Black, American Indian/Eskimo/Aleut, Asian or Paciﬁc Islander, and
other). The three-category breakdown of race was thought to be too simplistic and was abandoned
in 1988 for the more empirically useful ﬁve category breakdown. Beginning in 2003, respondents
could report more than one race, and the number of codes increased to 21 making it more diﬃcult to
compare racial identiﬁcation prior to 2003 with post 2003. Individuals who previously self-identiﬁed
4as Black could now identify themselves as biracial, likewise, others who self-identiﬁed as White prior
to this change could now claim multi-racial status. One of the advantages of using the CPS via
IPUMS is that it makes cross-time comparisons using the March CPS data more feasible as variables
in IPUMS-CPS are coded identically or “harmonized” for 1962 to 2007.
2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1: Breakdown of Data by Racial Categories
Variable Observations % Probability of self-employment
Black US born 127,617 9.77 0.043
White US born 998,205 76.40 0.119
Black Naturalized 3,374 0.26 0.068
White Naturalized LDC 22936 1.76 0.115
White Naturalized DC 8491 0.64 0.198
Black Foreign 6,163 0.47 0.051
White Foreign LDC 61,327 4.69 0.063
White Foreign DC 7,059 0.54 0.148
American Indian/Aleut/Eskimo 18,368 1.41 0.073
Asian or Paciﬁc Islander US born 20,811 1.59 0.079
Naturalized Asian or Paciﬁc Islander LDC 9473 0.72 0.124
Naturalized Asian or Paciﬁc Islander DC 2164 0.17 0.249
Foreign Asian or Paciﬁc Islander LDC 11,591 0.89 0.065
Foreign Asian or Paciﬁc Islander DC 3,487 0.27 0.190
Other (single) race 5,579 0.43 0.057
Table (1) provides an overview of the data sample used in this research. The sample includes
1,296,606 records where 84.04% of respondents reported race as White, 10.4% as Black, 1.41%
as American Indian, Aleut or Eskimo, 3.63% as Asians or Paciﬁc Islanders, and 0.43% classify
themselves as Other. This table provides a break-down of the data set into relevant subgroups. These
subgroups are based on race and on citizenship status. We divide individuals into those who are
U.S born, U.S. naturalized citizen, and non U.S. citizen. For individuals who are immigrants and/or
naturalized citizens we partition the data by home country economic standing i.e., developed or
5developing. For each sub-groups we highlight its’ share in the population and provide the estimated
probability of U.S. self-employment. For example foreign Asians or Paciﬁc Islanders from developed
countries (DC) are 0.27% of the population and have a 19% probability of being self-employed.
The groups with the highest probabilities of self-employment are naturalized Asians from developed
countries followed by naturalized Whites from developed countries.
2.3 Self-employment rates across countries
The Yearbook of Labor Statistics provides the needed data for calculating each country’s labor
force share that selects self-employment as their major source of income and/or ﬁnancial support.
Table (2) provides available data, for each country, corresponding to the percent of each country’s
labor force which selects self-employment. The data reveals that countries which are categorized
as developing nations, by IMF and World Bank standards, tend to on average have higher self-
employment percentages than do those that are listed as developed nations. However, it is also
important to note that among both developing and developed countries, there is signiﬁcant variation
in self-employment percentages. Given the ﬁndings summarized in Table (2), and the literature
which suggests that self-employment rates for immigrants to the U.S. should mimic home country
self-employment rates, a priori, we would expect immigrants from developing countries to have
higher probability of self-employment in the U.S. than do their developed country counterparts.
3 Econometric Model and Results
3.1 General econometric model
To investigate the impact of immigrant home country’s economic status on the probability of self-
employment, we estimate a variants of equation (1) making use of three diﬀerent empirical strategies.
Equation (1) is a simple self-employment probability model:
Prob(Y = 1) = F(β′X) (1)
where X is a matrix of all the possible factors impacting the probability of self-employment. If
Y=1, an individual is self-employed, whereas Y=0 indicates that an individual is a wage worker.
6Table 2: self-employment rates in select Developing and Developed Countries
Developing Countries Developed Countries
Country source year Self Emp. Ratio Country source year Self Emp. Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Russian LFS 2004 0.076 United Kingdom LFS 2003 0.039
Estonia LFS 2003 0.088 Luxembourg LFS 2004 0.066
Macau, China LFS 2004 0.118 Norway LFS 2004 0.0707
Slovakia LFS 2004 0.12 United States LFS 2004 0.073
Ukraine LFS 2003 0.124 France LFS 2004 0.116
Malta LFS 2004 0.137 Netherlands LFS 2004 0.121
Hungary LFS 2004 0.15 Finland LFS 2004 0.127
Bulgaria LFS 2004 0.152 Australia LFS 2004 0.129
Slovenia LFS 2004 0.155 Switzerland LFS 2004 0.133
Czech Republic LFS 2004 0.168 New Zealand LFS 2004 0.135
Lithuania LFS 2004 0.186 Israel Unknown 2004 0.144
Mauritius Other 2004 0.197 Japan LFS 2004 0.148
Croatia LFS 2004 0.209 Canada LFS 2004 0.154
Cyprus LFS 2004 0.237 Spain Unknown 2004 0.193
Panama LFS 2004 0.265 Ireland Other 2004 0.201
Macedonia LFS 2003 0.273 Portugal LFS 2004 0.262
Argentina LFS 2004 0.279 S. Korea, Unknown 2004 0.366
Uruguay LFS 2004 0.294 Greece LFS 2005 0.375
Romania LFS 2004 0.341 Average 0.146
Indonesia LFS 2003 0.345
Moldova Unknown 2004 0.367
Pakistan LFS 2003 0.373
Honduras LFS 2001 0.388
Mexico LFS 2004 0.403
Azerbaijan LFS 2003 0.435
Sri Lanka LFS 2003 0.441
Guatemala LFS 2004 0.446
Ethiopia LFS 2004 0.495
Zimbabwe LFS 1999 0.538
Thailand LFS 2000 0.545
Georgia LFS 2003 0.659
Albania Other 2001 0.685
Bolivia Other 2000 0.704
Madagascar LFS 2001 0.815
Tanzania LFS 2000 0.931
Average 0.347
Notes: LFS -Labor Force Survey Self Emp.-Self-employment Ratio
7We rewrite this function in linear regression form in equation (2). However, for the purpose of
estimation we employ probit, logit, and linear modeling strategies.
Y = θ0 + θ1Ω + θ2Z + θ3W +
X
i
 iRi + ǫ (2)








In equations (2), (3) and (4), the dependent variable is a binary indicator which takes on a
value of 1 if an individual is self-employed and a value of 0 if the individual is a wage-earner. Φ(.)
in equation (3) indicates the standard normal distribution and Λ(.) in equation (4)indicates the
logistic cumulative distribution function. Variables included in the Ω matrix are sex, education,
number of children in the family, size of the family, marital status, cohort of birth, region, whether
an individual lives in a metro area, if observation is a male with child, if observation is male and
married, and home ownership status. Z is a matrix of dummy variables including year and region
dummies, and ﬁxed eﬀects. The vector W captures the proxy for wealth. This research makes use
of two wealth proxies; interest income and dividend income. As deﬁned in the CPS, interest income
captures how much pre-tax income (if any) the respondent received from interest on saving accounts,
certiﬁcates of deposit, money market funds, bonds, treasury notes, IRAs, and/or other investments
that pay interest. In contrast, dividend income captures returns that respondents received from
stocks and mutual funds during the previous calendar year. Interest income is clearly a more
broad measure and provides a better proxy of wealth, however, the dividend income wealth proxy
allows examination of the robustness of our results. We estimate models using both wealth proxies
and get similar results, but we focus primarily on results obtained using interest income.2 The R
matrix contains dummy variables that captures our break down of the population based on race,
2In Belton and Uwaifo (2008) arguments for why interest income makes a good proxy for saving/wealth are high-
lighted.
8immigration status, and for foreign born, home country economic status. R1 ∼ U.S born Black,
R2 ∼ Foreign Black, R3 American Indian/Eskimio and Aluet, R4 ∼ Foreign Asians from
developed countries, R5 ∼ Foreign Asians from developing countries, R6 ∼ Naturalized
Asians from developing countries, R7 ∼ Naturalized Asians from developed countries,
R8 ∼ Asian-Americans, R9 ∼ Others, R10 ∼ Naturalized American Whites from less
developed countries, R11 ∼ Naturalized American Whites from developed countries,
R12 ∼ Naturalized American Blacks, R13 ∼ Foreign Whites from LDC (less developed
or developing country), R14 ∼ Foreign Whites from DC (developed country). The vector
of coeﬃcients on the R matrix is the focus of our analysis. Note, in this analysis the baseline group
for comparison is U.S born White Americans. Finally, ǫ is a vector of error terms. In this research
the variables of interest are the R5, R4, R7, R6, R10, R11, R2, R12, R13 and R14. We do not partition
foreign Blacks or naturalized Blacks into those from LDCs and DCs because the number of Blacks
in our data set that immigrate from DCs is insigniﬁcant and does not provide a suﬃciently large
test sample.
We estimate equation (2), (3) and (4) the linear, probit and logit models. In addition to pre-
senting the estimated coeﬃcients from the all models, we also present the marginal eﬀects from the
probit estimation. These eﬀects represent the marginal impact of an inﬁnitesimal change in each
independent continuous variable on the probability of self-employment, providing the most straight
forward interpretation of estimated results from the probit models. For race dummy variables, the
interpretations are slightly diﬀerent as the estimates capture the marginal eﬀect of a change in
the probability of being self-employed for a particular racial group relative to the baseline group.
Similarly, for ease of interpretation, we present the odds ratio using the logit model.3 The linear
probability speciﬁcation of the binary choice model also provides ease of interpretation. However
care must be taken because, unless restrictions are placed on estimates, coeﬃcients can imply prob-
abilities outside the unit interval.
9Table 3: Does economic status of home country matter for immigrant self-employment?
Variable: Saving Indicator 1 Savings Indicator 2
logit odds ratio Linear Probit M.E logit odds ratio Linear Probit M.E
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
logincint 0.091* 1.095* 0.01* 0.048* 0.009*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.0003)
logdefdiv 0.053* 1.05* 0.006* 0.029* 0.006*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.0006) (0.003) (0.0006)
10.56 10.56 10.86 10.58 10.58
Black -0.734* 0.48* -0.048* -0.359* -0.054* -0.796* 0.4509692 -0.060* -0.396* -0.069*
(0.040) (0.019) (0.002) (0.019) (0.002) (0.079) (0.036) (0.005) (0.039) (0.005)
BlackF -0.348* 0.706* -0.02* -0.175* -0.029* -0.636* 0.529* -0.042* -0.347* -0.061*
(0.148) (0.105) (0.008) (0.072) (0.010) (0.364) (0.193) (0.019) (0.172) (0.024)
A/A/E -0.269* 0.766* -0.025* -0.13* -0.022* -0.319* 0.727* -0.037* -0.160** -0.032**
(0.093) (0.071) (0.008) (0.049) (0.008) (0.161) (0.117) (0.016) (0.089) (0.016)
ForAsDC 0.480* 1.616* 0.052* 0.253* 0.054* 0.542* 1.72* 0.072* 0.300* 0.075*
(0.109) (0.176) (0.014) (0.06) (0.015) (0.215) (0.37) (0.034) (0.121) (0.035)
ForAsLDC -0.286* 0.752* -0.026* -0.147* -0.0245* -0.156 0.855 -0.018 -0.084* -0.017
(0.08) (0.060) (0.006) (0.040) (0.006) (0.140) (0.12) (0.013) (0.073) (0.014)
NAAsLDC -0.029 0.971 -0.004 -0.016 -0.003 -0.137 0.872 -0.0168 -0.077 -0.016
(0.055) (0.054) (0.006) (0.03) (0.005) (0.09) (0.079) (0.011) (0.049) (0.01)
NAAsDC 0.789* 2.202* 0.110* 0.436* 0.102* 0.768* 2.16* 0.115* 0.432*3 0.115*
(0.095) (0.209) (0.016) (0.055) (0.016) (0.162) (0.348) (0.029) (0.095) (0.030)
AAsiann -0.293* 0.746* -0.028* -0.152* -0.025* -0.30* 0.744* -0.032* -0.155* -0.031*
(0.067) (0.05) (0.006) (0.035) (0.005) (0.104) (0.077) (0.01) (0.054) (0.01)
Others -0.458* 0.632* -0.04* -0.231* -0.037* -0.524 0.592 -0.049* -0.294** -0.054**
(0.148) (0.094) (0.01) (0.075) (0.01) (0.331) (0.196) (0.026) (0.174) (0.026)
NAWLDC 0.146* 1.157* 0.016* 0.078* 0.015* 0.106 1.11 0.014 0.063 0.014
(0.041) (0.048) (0.005) (0.023) (0.005) (0.076) (0.085) (0.01) (0.043) (0.01)
NAWDC 0.369* 1.45* 0.051* 0.208* 0.043* 0.340* 1.41* 0.053* 0.198* 0.047*
(0.054) (0.077) (0.008) (0.030) (0.007) (0.088) (0.123) (0.015) (0.050) (0.013)
NAB -0.310* 0.734* -0.027* -0.163* -0.027* -0.289 0.748 -0.028 -0.129 -0.026
(0.133) (0.097) (0.01) (0.068) (0.01) (0.259) (0.194) (0.023) (0.139) (0.026)
WFLDC 0.018 1.018 0.0002 0.01 0.002 0.137 1.146 0.014 0.073 0.016
(0.048) (0.049) (0.004) (0.025) (0.005) (0.119) (0.136) (0.013) (0.064) ( 0.015)
WFDC 0.352* 1.42* 0.04* 0.190* 0.039* 0.336* 1.40* 0.044* 0.183* 0.043*
(0.061) (0.087) (0.008) (0.034) (0.008) (0.103) (0.145) (0.015) (0.059) (0.015)
Constant -2.64* 0.114* -1.51* -2.92* 0.083* -1.66*
(0.238) (0.03) (0.13) (0.411) (0.055) (0.224)
Controls: age, age2, education, number of children, owning a home, head of household, male with child,
male married, family size, metro area, cohort, region, year dummies, martial status, gender.
Variable descriptionA/A/E American Indian/Aleut/Eskimo; NAB-Naturalized American Black; BlackF-
Black foreign; WFLC- White foreign less developing countries, FWDC- White foreign developed coun-
tries; race3-Native American,Aleut and Alaskan; NAWLDC-Naturalized White LDC; NAWDC-Naturalized
White from DC; AAsian-U.S born Asian or Paciﬁc Islander(PI); NAAsLDC-Naturalized Asian/PI from
LDC; NAAsDC -Naturalized Asian/PI from DC; ForAsLDC-foreign Asians/PI from LDC; ForAsDC-foreign
Asian/PI from DC. Column (1)-(5) control for resource using interest income and columns (6) to (10) controls
for resource using dividend income.
M.E-Marginal Eﬀects
103.2 Estimation Results
Table (3) provides linear, logit, probit, and probit marginal eﬀects estimation results of equation
(1). We focus primarily on marginal eﬀects results in columns (5) and (10). Our results show
that foreign Blacks have a 2.9% lower probability of being self-employed than native born White
Americans. Since most foreign Blacks in the U.S are immigrants from developing countries, the
coeﬃcient associated with foreign Blacks represent a direct comparison of Blacks from developing
countries to U.S. born White Americans.
In the case of Asians, we ﬁnd that foreign Asians from less developed countries (LDCs) have a
2.5% lower probability of self-employment than native born White Americans, while foreign Asians
from developed countries (DCs) have a 5.4% higher probability of being self-employed than native
born White Americans. The diﬀerence between foreign Asians immigrants from developed and de-
veloping countries is signiﬁcant as foreign Asians from developed countries are over 7% more likely
to be self-employed than are their counterparts from developing countries. Previous research has
oﬀered various explanations for the high rates of Asian self-employment including high levels of
human and ﬁnancial capital, rotating credit associations, and access to co-ethnic labor and cus-
tomers(See Bates (1997), Zhou (2004) and Light (2004)). However, our results show that not all
Asians enjoy these advantages. Foreign Asians from less developed countries have similar probabil-
ities of self-employment to that of foreign Blacks from less developed countries. This ﬁnding makes
the argument of disproportionate Asian self-employment success somewhat less tenable.
Examining the home country’s economic status impact for Whites, we ﬁnd similar results as in
the case of Asians. Foreign White immigrants from developing countries have a similar probability
of self-employment to that of White Americans while foreign White immigrants from developed
countries have a 3.9% higher probability of self-employment than do native born White Americans.
These results show that consistent across race, foreigners from developed countries have a higher
probability of self-employment than do those from developing countries, while those from developing
countries had lower or equal probability of self-employment to that of U.S. born Whites. This result
3The odds ratio are the exponentiated coeﬃcients in an ordinary logistic regression.
11may suggest that an immigrants home country’s economic status matters for self-employment.
3.3 Robustness
Results above reveal that self-employment probabilities diﬀers among foreign immigrant groups
based on home country economic status. However, to test the robustness of our home country’s eco-
nomic status impact, we examine self-employment trends among naturalized American immigrants.
Naturalized Americans are immigrants who have been able to successfully change their citizenship
status over time. Looking again at the marginal eﬀects in columns (5) and (10) and focusing ﬁrst
on naturalized Asians from LDCs. We ﬁnd that their self-employment probability is identical to
that of U.S born Whites, while their counterparts, naturalized Asians from DCs have a 10% higher
probability of self-employment than U.S. born Whites. Once again the developed country eﬀect is
signiﬁcant for naturalized Asians as the gap between the self-employment probabilities for natural-
ized Asians from developed countries versus developing countries is larger than is this diﬀerence for
foreign Asian immigrants.
As in the Asian case, we also examine the home country’s economic status impact on self-
employment probabilities for naturalized Whites. We ﬁnd that naturalized White Americans from
less developed countries have a 1.5% higher probability of being self-employed than U.S. born Whites
while their comparable counterparts, naturalized Whites from developed countries have a 4.3%
higher probability of being self-employed than U.S. born Whites. Clearly, empirical results show
that across race and citizenship status immigrant home country level of economic development
impacts the probability of self-employment.
As a further test of the validity of the results, we follow the approach of Fairlie and Meyers
(1996) and reestimate the model using only a sample for which home country’s economic status
eﬀect is relevant. We drop all Americans from the data set and estimate equation (1) using a
sample of non-citizens. In this case the R variable is a dummy indicating home country economic
status, where developed home country=1 and less developed home country=0. The results of this
analysis is summarized in Table (4). Column (1) summarize results from the logit model using both
interest income and dividend income as wealth proxies. Column (2) shows the marginal eﬀects of
12the probit model using both wealth proxies. The inclusion of dividend income leads to a fall in
the number of sample observations because only a few survey participants report dividend income
holdings. Column (3) reveals that excluding dividend income and using only interest income as
a wealth proxy does not change results signiﬁcantly. We ﬁnd that immigrants from developed
countries have a 4% higher probability of being self-employed in the U.S. than do immigrants from
developing countries. This result is similar to that obtained when the entire data set is used in
model estimation. Recall that there was a 7% point diﬀerence between foreign Asians from DCs
and their counterpart from LDCs and a 4% point diﬀerence between foreign White Americans from
LDC and foreign White Americans from DCs. The dummy variable in this case is a mean of eﬀects
of foreign Asians and foreign Whites from developed countries.
4 Explaining the Developed Country Eﬀect
We explore two likely explanations for the result that immigrants from developed countries have
higher probability of self-employed in the U.S. than do immigrants from developing countries. We
examine a resources availability argument and an economic institutional diﬀerence argument, how-
ever, we can not conclude with signiﬁcant conﬁdence that these two arguments provide the only
explanations for our empirical result.
4.1 The Resource Explanation
Bogan and Darity (2008) highlight the resource availability issue in self-employment decision, arguing
that many immigrants have assess to resources from their home country making self-employment
success more likely. Resource endowments could diﬀer across developed and less developed countries
as foreigners from less developed countries are less likely to have tangible capital resources and assets
that can be transferred to the U.S. Hence, if resource availability aﬀects entry into self-employment,
then according to the Bogan and Darity (2008) argument, foreigners from less developed countries
should have a lower probability of self-employment than do those from developed countries. If the
explanation for the gap is resources, then controlling for resources in our probability model should
help to explain the developed versus developing country gap. Results summarized in Tables (2)
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employment?
logit marginal eﬀects marginal eﬀects
(1) (2) (3)
Developed Home Country 0.323* 0.0387* 0.0407*
(0.138) (0.016) (0.007)
log saving proxy 0.046 0.005 0.007
(0.037) (0.004) (0.001)
log dividend 0.035 0.005
(0.035) (0.004)
education -0.0478** -0.006* 0.0002
(0.026) (0.003) (0.0008)
age 0.155 0.015 0.005
(0.113) (0.012) (0.004)
sex -1.18* -0.12* -0.064*
(0.33) (0.036) (0.0117)
no. of children 0.006 -0.004 0.006
(0.128) (0.014) (0.004)
own a home 0.524* 0.0557* 0.044*
(0.172) (0.017) (0.006)
family size -0.083 -0.007 -0.006*
(0.095) (0.01) (0.0027)
Head 0.449* 0.0492* 0.017*
(0.156) (0.017) (0.006)
male married -0.997* -0.1* -0.034*
(0.396) (0.042) (0.014)
male with child 0.0624 0.012 -0.006
(0.25) (0.029) (0.01)
No of obs. 2404 2404 15129
Controls: age, age2, education, number of children, owning a home, head of household, male with child,
male married, family size, metro area, cohort, region, year dummies, martial status, gender.
Variable description Columns (1) and (2) control for resource using interest income and dividend income.
The sample of those with no dividend income is substantial and explains the drop in number of observations.
See column(3) where wealth is only controlled for using savings the sample size is much larger.
14and (3) reveal that after controlling for resource availability using two wealth indicators the gap
remains. The persistence of the gap does not imply that the results cannot be explained with a
resource argument but may point to limitation in capturing wealth and/or savings resources for
foreigners. Belton and Oyelere (2008) point out that the reliability of immigrant ﬁnancial resource
data maybe questionable given that many U.S. immigrants maintain ﬁnancial relationships in their
home country and tend to engage in signiﬁcant remittance to the home country. This behavior
suggests that savings and/or wealth of immigrants are less likely to be captured with accuracy in
U.S. data sources. Data on remittances from the World Bank highlights the top 10 remittance
recipients in 2007 for developing countries. They are: India ($27.0 bn), China ($25.7 bn), Mexico
($25.0 bn), Philippines ($17.0 bn), Romania ($6.8 bn), Bangladesh ($6.4 bn), Pakistan ($6.1 bn),
Indonesia ($6.0 bn), Egypt, Arab Rep. ($5.9 bn), and Morocco ($5.7 bn). Remittances ﬂowing to less
developed countries are substantial however, developed countries are also recipients of signiﬁcant
amounts of remittances. The top 10 in 2007 are: France ($12.5 bn), Spain ($8.9 bn), Belgium
($7.2 bn), United Kingdom ($7.0 bn), Germany ($7.0 bn), Portugal ($3.8 bn), Austria ($3.5 bn),
Australia ($3.1 bn), United States ($3.0 bn), and Italy ($2.6 bn). It is interesting to note that
signiﬁcant remittances ﬂow from developed to developing countries and from developed to developed
countries. However, given home country economic conditions it is more likely that remittance to
developing countries represent consumption subsides to developing country families. In contrast,
remittance to developed countries is more likely for savings and investment purposes rather than
a consumption subsidy. This diﬀerence in remittance could have a direct impact on our empirical
analysis. Our estimates for access and level of capital and/or wealth resources for all immigrants is
likely to be underestimated, however, we are more likely to underestimate this diﬀerence for those
from developed countries rather than those from developing countries. Hence, measurement error in
our control for wealth could be, in part, responsible for the remaining self-employment gap between
immigrants from developed relative to less developed countries.
154.2 The Institution and Information explanation
An alternative explanation for this result is the role of institutions and information. It is important
to note that even if resource availability is the same for individual immigrants across developed and
less developed countries, institutional development and the ability to access informational resources
could explain the developed country eﬀect. Recall that we have controlled, in some form, (directly
or through proxy variables) for all the likely candidate that impact self-employment, however, we are
not able to control for institutional similarity. For example, banking and communications systems
operate in a similar fashion across developed countries. In addition, institutional, technological,
and logistical similarities suggest that businesses form and operate similarly in developed countries
but very diﬀerently than those in developing countries. Further, skill levels needed to operate a
small business in LDCs may be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than those needed in developed countries. In
addition, the logistics needed to start a business could be very diﬀerent between developing and
developed countries, but similar across developed countries. The institutional and developmental
similarities across developed countries could provide immigrants from a developed country a signif-
icant information advantage over those from LDCs in their eﬀort to pursue self-employment in the
U.S. Hence, we argue that the more similar are U.S. institutions to an immigrant’s home country
the more quickly immigrants are able to assimilate and get involved in U.S. self-employment ac-
tivities. Recall that North (1973) deﬁnes institutions as the formal and informal rules that guide
social interactions. Moreover, if in the entrepreneurship arena, institutions in the North sense and
business “know how” are similar across developed countries but are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent relative
to developing countries, then the results found in this paper are expected. In summary, though
immigrants from LDCs have more historical exposure to self-employment relative to immigrants
from DCs, given, potential diﬀerence in experiences and diﬀerent information sets for LDC immi-
grants, DC immigrants when all prior conditions are considered, may ﬁnd it easier to transition into
self-employment in the U.S.
Though we cannot directly test the institutional hypothesis, we know that institutional impacts
are long-lived and that it takes time to acquire new skill sets, institution speciﬁc business “know
16how”, and acquire information. Our results show a persistence in the gap in self-employment
between immigrants from developed countries relative to those from developing countries, even
after naturalization.4 This result is compatible with institutional and/or informational explanations
for the gap.
4.3 Evidence For Institutions and Against Resource
Interestingly, the results in Table (2) provides suggestive evidence in support of the information and
institution argument. In addition the results highlight why resource diﬀerences may not fully explain
our research results. The possibility that there are alternative explanations for the gap is reﬂected in
the diﬀerential behavior noted when comparing naturalized citizens to foreign immigrants from DCs
relative to LDCs. Naturalized citizen unlike foreigners have full access to the U.S ﬁnancial systems.
Given that naturalized citizens are not legally constrained, access to capital is in all likelihood less
diﬃcult than for their foreign counterparts. If we assume that the resource constraint is binding for
all immigrants, leading to a reduction in self-employment success, then when immigrants become
naturalized we should see similar increases in self-employment as this constraint is relaxed. This
result implies that coeﬃcients diﬀerences between naturalized relative to foreign immigrants across
race and home country economic status should be similar. The results in Table (2), however, do
not support this outcome. We note that there is a 1.5% point higher probability of self-employment
for naturalized Whites from LDCs relative to foreign Whites from LDCs. This increase is larger
than the 0.4% point increase when comparing naturalized Whites from DCs to foreign Whites from
DCs. In contrast, we ﬁnd a 2.45% point higher probability of self-employment for naturalized Asian
from LDCs in comparison to foreign Asian from LDCs. This diﬀerence is smaller than the 4.8%
point higher probability of self-employment when comparing naturalized Asians from DCs to foreign
Asians from DCs. Further, comparing naturalized Blacks to foreign Blacks, who are in most cases
from developing countries, we ﬁnd a 0.2% increase in self-employment probabilities, although this
diﬀerence is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The lack of consistency across race suggest that
43 years is the least time it takes to become a citizen which occurs if one marries a U.S citizen. Typically, it take
at least 5 years from becoming a permanent resident of the U.S.
17the resources availability may not be the only mechanism impacting self-employment decision for
immigrants from both developed and developing countries.5 In addition, the lack of increase in self-
employment for naturalized Blacks and lower increase for naturalized Asians from LDCs relative to
those form DCs, provides evidence in support of our institution/information argument. The impact
of institutions are long-lived and becoming a naturalized citizen though it may reduces resource
restriction does not eliminate the issues of skill miss-matches and other problems highlighted above
that immigrants from LDC’s are more likely to face.
5 Conclusion and Recommendations
This research ﬁnds that home country’s economic status matters for self-employment of immigrants.
Speciﬁcally across race, immigrants from developed countries tend to engage in self-employment at
a higher rate than all survey participants. Data errors in measurement of wealth/ﬁnancial resources
could account for this developed country advantage i.e., the economic development proxy used
here could provide an additional wealth or ﬁnancial resource measure. Conversely, the developed
country eﬀect could represent a proxy for institutional and development infrastructure of the country
of origin, which when similar to the U.S provides for easy assimilation into self-employment. We do
not ﬁnd evidence that immigrants from countries with high levels of self-employment have higher
levels of self-employment in the U.S. This again may points to the institutional explanation that
despite high self-employment in the home country, if institutions are not similar, the transfer of the
skill and knowledge might be slower despite an individuals exposure to self-employment in the past.
This research is the ﬁrst to examine the impact of immigrants home country economic status
on the probability of self-employment, and our results are at variance with the literature which
suggests that immigrants are more likely to be entrepreneurs if immigrating from countries with
high levels of self-employment. We care about this result because entrepreneurship is one of the
drivers of economic growth and immigration has become important to U.S labor force growth. There
5If we assume resources were not a binding constraint for those from developed countries then all thing being
equal we should see a smaller increase in self-employment as individuals transition from foreign to Naturalized if home
country is a developed country in comparison to those from developing countries. The results for White immigrants
ﬁts this trend but the results for Asians and Blacks runs counter to this trend which again highlights other possible
explanations for the results.
18is some evidence that suggests that immigrants from developing countries are more likely to exploit
U.S. social welfare programs than are those from developed countries. Given the increase in the
number of immigrants from LDCs relative to DCs, then understanding the factors that impact
self-employment may lead to better policy outcomes. Many immigrants, particularly those from
non-English speaking countries, have diﬃculty making the transition into the formal labor sector
because in many instances skills and education are not easily transferable. For these immigrants,
self-employment becomes one possible mechanism for assimilation and eventual movement into the
U.S. work force. Understanding barriers to assimilation and other issues that lead to a slower
than expected integration into U.S. economic life becomes a prerogative. We hope to focus future
research on trying to disentangle the impact of capital resource access from diﬀerences in institutional
framework on assimilation into self-employment.
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